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21 October 1981

West Europe Report

(FOUO 54/81)



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ECONOMIC

FRANCE

NEW LOOK AT CONCORDE SITUATION SEEN POSSIBLE

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 5 Sep 81 p 9

[Article: "Concorde on Agenda of President Mitterrand and Mrs Thatcher"]

[Text] Reporting on her visit to Latche where she was President Mitterrand's guest, Nicole Kern wrote as follows about the Concorde [supersonic transport] in LE FIGARO of 28 August: "Francois Mitterrand acknowledged with much regret that its commercial operation will have to be cancelled even though he considers it a remarkable technical achievement."

In London on 10-11 September

This statement, which was not denied, prompted a great many comments on both sides of the English Channel. The Office of the President of the Republic announced: "No special study of Concorde commercial operations is being conducted at the present time. Concorde service is governed by an international collaborative agreement between Great Britain and France and is periodically reviewed by representatives of both governments." The same source also indicated that the Concorde situation would probably be discussed during the coming French-British top-level meetings to be held in London on 10-11 September, meetings whose agenda has not yet been officially confirmed.

If this does happen, the Concorde situation, which is periodically discussed between the French minister of transportation and the British secretary of state for industry, would thus, move back up to the very highest political echelon, a level at which it has not been since the earliest days of the Concorde program's difficult beginnings.

Since then, Air France and British Airways have brilliantly demonstrated the transport's technical qualities and shown that there is a body of customers for the ultrarapid service provided by this type of aircraft, the only one of its kind in regular international commercial operation. Continuously rising fuel costs are, however, having a severe impact on Concorde operations.

We have the feeling that neither British Airways nor Air France want to end their supersonic service, and this despite certain restrictions imposed on the operating capabilities of the seven Concorde transports owned by the two airlines. An official British report even concludes that, on the other side of the channel, Concorde operations are considered to be producing slightly positive financial results.

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When Joel Le Theule was minister of transportation, we were allowed to look at the position papers he was taking to a meeting on Concorde with his British colleague not so long ago. We were able to note how extremely complicated that documentation was. Consequently we believe we can firmly state that such papers are not discussible in detail at a meeting of the highest political leaders.

Toward A New Ministerial Meeting

President Mitterrand and Prime Minister Thatcher are, therefore, likely to instruct Charles Fiterman and his British counterpart to conduct a new review of Concorde operations, a new review that was, in fact, already planned. At this stage, it would be advisable for the French not to appear, for the first time, to be calling for the cessation of Concorde service, because the British continue to maintain that we have not discharged our full share of this project's costs and would, therefore, make us pay dearly for such a request.

No Definite Prospects in the United States

Beyond any immediate financial and commercial reflections upon Concorde's future, consideration must be given to looking ahead and trying to determine under what possible conditions the Concorde could be linked with a new generation of supersonic airliners. Jack L. Kerrebrock, administrator of the U.S. Office of Aeronautical and Space Technology, recently told AVIATION DAILY that there would be a new supersonic transport someday but that it does not seem desirable, at this stage, to emphasize such a program. NASA continues to work on the variable cycle engine so as to be in a position to contribute to the development of this type of engine when the time comes. Some funding is being provided for research on the most critical components of an advanced supersonic transport, but this funding support is less than the amount which had been included in the initial 1982 budget proposed by the Carter administration.

It follows from these remarks that the U.S. research and development effort is not aimed at any foreseeable target date for actual production of a new supersonic transport. Assurance of a direct link between the Concorde and the new-generation supersonic transports now appears to be increasingly unlikely.

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POLITICAL

BELGIUM

POLL ON POPULARITY OF LEADING POLITICIANS

Brussels POURQUOI PAS? in French 17 Sep 81 pp 7-9

[Report on exclusive survey, conducted by Marketing Unit: "The Political Barometer: Mark Eyskens Takes Tumble; Wilfried Martens Recaptures Lead; Guy Spitaels Becomes Mister Wallonia; Irresistible Rise of Eric Van Rompuy"]

[Text] The goal of the political barometer "P.P.? - Marketing Unit" is to determine the popularity of those who govern us. The question asked of the respondents was: "For each of the following political personalities, please tell me whether you would like to see him play an important role in the coming months?"

The survey was conducted between 1 and 4 September 1981 by Marketing Unit, a company specializing in market study and public opinion polls, with a sample of 1,121 Belgians, 18 years of age and older, structured by sex, age, type of housing, and socioeconomic class.

The results were weighed according to the size of the country's regions.

Marketing Unit is a member of Febelmar, the professional association of Public Opinion Institutes.

At a time when Mark Eyskens is trying desperately to hang on to power, we see that his rating has dropped considerably in the country as a whole.

Indeed, he has lost four points at the national level, thus moving to third place, behind Wilfried Martens who, in spite of his exile, has not lost any of his credit. Mr Martens undoubtedly remains an important element, which it would be absurd to ignore for the future.

On the other hand, Mark Eyskens moved down everywhere, and particularly in Brussels where he lost 14 points, which obviously seems enormous.

Obviously, the prime minister is paying very dearly for his tricky policy and also for the softness and lack of courage which have presided over the development of his scandalous budget. At the time of our April 1981 survey, Mr Eyskens, the bearer of all hopes, was rising at a lightning speed. Obviously, it was not long before he disappointed everyone.

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However, let us also note the relative stability of Leo Tindemans, and this in spite of his recent setbacks, specifically concerning the presidency of the Council of Europe. Let us nevertheless point out that the ayatollah from Edegem is beginning to lose ground, even in the Flanders.

Having said this, the biggest surprise remains the irresistible rise of Guy Spitaels who, over a 5 month period, has become a very important national figure.

As a matter of fact, while he advanced 5 points at the national level, he won 14 points in Wallonia, becoming the most popular politician from the southern part of the country. Is he thus drawing the dividends of his often advanced attitude in community matters?

Another significant phenomenon, but this time in the Flanders, was the irresistible rise of Eric Van Rompuy, the president of the CVP [Social Christian Party - Flemish] Youth, who, over a 1 year period, went from 7 to 24 points and who won the 10th place at the level of the national audience, even ahead of people like Schiltz, De Croo, Chabert, Gol, Simonet, or Leburton. Mr Van Rompuy has obviously benefited from admirable marketing, even if some people confuse him with his brother Herman, the (non-conformist) director of the CVP Study Bureau.

Among the noticeable setbacks, we should mention Vanden Boeynants who, with 30 percent, returned to the low score he had already received in June 1980. Unquestionably, his presidency of the PSC [Christian Social Party - French], which is perhaps considered as lacking in determination, no longer receives the credit he could have hoped for. The operation of opposition to the Eyskens budget, which he has just started, will probably allow him to regain his former position. But public opinion obviously expects more radicalism from him.

Let us finally note that Mr Glinne, Guy Spitaels' former challenger for the presidency, has returned to a relative obscurity, having been literally crushed by the surprising score of the president of the PS [Socialist Party - French].

On the other hand, the other Belgian leaders remained "stationary," with the exception of RW [Walloon Rally] leader Henri Mordant who, for the first time, does not even appear among the top 20 in the national classification, having lost 4 points in Wallonia, which is harsh.

The independents of Messrs Duvieusart and Gendebien on the one hand, and his desire to merge with the FDF [Democratic Front of Brussels French Speakers] on the other, all of this crowned by the prevailing confusion within the party, have been most harmful to him. For the rest, neither PSC leaders Maystadt and Desmarets, nor UDRT [Union for Democracy and Respect for Labor] leader Hendrick managed to cross the borders of credibility.

Mark Eyskens: Declining Support

To complete this survey, we wanted to test the credibility of Mr Eyskens by asking the following question:

"Do you have confidence that the prime minister will be able to solve the problems which are currently facing Belgium?"

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The response was enlightening as only 7 percent of the Belgians have full confidence in Gaston's son, and 30 percent are rather confident, which brings us to a total of 37 percent. On the other hand, 19 percent are rather not confident and 22 percent have no confidence at all, which brings the distrust vote to 45 percent, with 18 percent with no opinion.

Now, it should be noted that in November 1980, in response to the same question, Mr Martens won 48 percent of the confidence votes as against 36 percent opposed, which was really an excellent score.

Obviously, the majority of the Belgians no longer have much confidence that Mark Eyskens will be able to solve our problems, even if 38 percent wish to see him continue to play a political role, probably a more subordinate one. Watch out for the slippery slope!

TABLE 1. Election Results.

	Percentage	
1. Wilfried Martens (2)	42	(S.Q.)*
2. Leo Tindemans (3)	38	(- 2)
3. Mark Eyskens (1)	38	(- 4)
4. Willy Claes (4)	35	(- 4)
5. Karel van Miert (7)	33	(S.Q.)
6. Guy Spitaels (8)	33	(+ 5)
7. Willy De Clercq (5)	31	(- 3)
8. Vanden Boeynants (6)	30	(- 4)
9. Antoinette Spaak (9)	28	(+ 1)
10. Erik van Rompuy (24)	24	(in September '80; ?)
11. Guy Mathot (12)	22	(S.Q.)
12. C.-F. Nothomb (14)	22	(+ 1)
13. Henri Simonet (11)	22	(S.Q.)
14. Andre Cools (10)	22	(S.Q.)
15. Jos. Chabert (15)	21	(S.Q.)
16. Hugo Schiltz (16)	21	(+ 2)
17. Edm. Leburton (13)	19	(- 2)
18. Jean Col (17)	19	(+ 2)
19. Ernest Glinne (20)	14	(- 1)
20. Herman De Croo (19)	14	(- 1)

Key: The first figure: rating of satisfaction in September 1981.
The second figure: the progress or decline of each personality.
Next to each name, their rank in April 1981.
S.Q. = no change.

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TABLE 2. WALLONIA.

	September 1981	April 1981	Difference
1. Guy Spitaels	48	34	+ 14
2. Antoinette Spaak	45	44	+ 1
3. Andre Cools	38	38	S.Q.
4. Wilfried Martens	38	38	S.Q.
5. Jean Gol	38	34	+ 4
6. Guy Mathot	37	37	S.Q.
7. Willy Claes	36	36	S.Q.
8. Vanden Boeynants	36	40	- 4
9. Mark Eyskens	35	37	- 2
10. C.-F. Nothomb	34	34	S.Q.
11. Edmond Leburton	33	37	- 4
12. Ernest Glinne	30	34	- 4
13. Henri Simonet	29	28	+ 1
14. Henri Mordant	29	33	- 4
15. Philippe Maystadt	27	28	- 1

Let us repeat: Guy Spitaels has become the indisputable socialist leader of Wallonia, retiring the likes of Mathot, Glinne and Leburton. He obviously has a definite support. Within the PSC, even though he has experienced a setback, Vanden Boeynants has kept his leading position, as against a stationary Nothomb and a Maystadt who obviously did not take off. On the other hand, timidly but regularly, PRL [Party of Liberty and Walloon Reform] leader Jean Gol has won his slot, going from 32 in November 1980 to 34 in April 1981, and to 38 today. This is rather significant. On the other hand, RW leader Henri Mordant has begun a serious decline, and this in contrast with Spaak, who is still going up. This should strengthen the FDF in its desire to present itself in Wallonia under its own label.

TABLE 3. BRUSSELS.

	September 1981	April 1981	Difference
1. Antoinette Spaak	49	51	- 2
2. Vanden Boeynants	47	51	- 4
3. Guy Spitaels	37	37	S.Q.
4. Mark Eyskens	33	46	- 14
5. Willy Claes	33	33	S.Q.
6. Wilfried Martens	33	39	- 6
7. Henri Simonet	33	36	- 3
8. Jean Gol	33	33	S.Q.
9. Willy De Clercq	33	38	- 5
10. C.-F. Nothomb	33	30	+ 3
11. Leo Tindemans	27	27	S.Q.
12. Karel van Miert	21	25	- 4
13. Edmond Leburton	21	not classified	
14. Jos. Chabert	21	not classified	
15. Andre Cools	21	25	- 4

Unquestionably, Mrs Spaak and Vanden Boeynants remain the two big leaders in Brussels, even if sometimes they go down rather noticeably. On the other hand, it is a Walloon, Mr Spitaels, who holds the lead on the socialist side. Henri Simonet, for his part, continues to decline in Brussels, even if he advances in

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Wallonia and in the Flanders, whereas the liberal Jean Gol desperately (for him) stagnates in Brussels. It is true that the Flemish liberal De Clercq is also experiencing a free fall, but the most sensational and most significant thrashing remains that of Mark Eyskens, who lost 14 points.

TABLE 4. FLANDERS

	September 1981	April 1981	Difference
1. Leo Tindemans	47	48	- 1
2. Mark Eyskens	46	46	S.Q.
3. Wilfried Martens	46	44	+ 2
4. Karel van Miert	46	47	- 1
5. Willy De Clercq	35	41	- 6
6. Eric van Rompuy	35	10	+ 25
		(Sep. 1980)	
7. Willy Claes	33	38	- 5
8. Hugo Schiltz	30	28	+ 2
9. Vanden Boeynants	24	27	- 3
10. Jos. Chabert	24	25	- 1
11. Herman De Croo	20	22	- 2
12. Guy Spitaels	18	22	- 4
13. Henri Simonet	16	15	+ 1
14. Andre Cools	13	12	+ 1
15. C.-F. Nothomb	11	10	+ 1

Things are obviously turning sour for the leaders of the PVV [Party of Liberty and Progress]. Minus 6 for Willy De Clercq, minus 2 for De Croo: that is beginning to hurt. Things are not more cheerful on the side of the socialists: since November 1980, Karel van Miert has been engaged in a slow but steady decline, whereas Willy De Clercq went from 41 in November 1980, to 38 in April 1981, to 33 today. This represents a very serious loss of support. On the other hand, although Tindemans and Mark Eyskens are still holding on, Wilfried Martens has taken off toward a new popularity. Having said this, the most surprising thing is unquestionably the fabulous upsurge of Eric van Rompuy, who has apparently become an established fact in the Flemish political scenery by cheerfully eclipsing the likes of De Croo, Chabert, Schiltz, and Claes, and by even catching up with De Clercq. Let us also note that the further Mr Spitaels advances in Wallonia, the more he falls on the Flemish side, going from 24 in November 1980 to 22 in April 1981, dropping to 18 today. This should undoubtedly comfort him in his Walloon crusade.

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

POST-AFGHANISTAN: SECURITY THREAT, EUROPEAN DEFENSE POLICY

Paris TRAVAUX ET RECHERCHES DE L'IFRI in French Fourth Quarter 1980 Vol 1 pp 335-343

[Article by Francois de Rose, French Ambassador and former permanent representative of France to NATO. Section V, part 1, of new series, TRAVAUX ET RECHERCHES DE L'IFRI. Vol 1 is "The Security of Europe in the 80's", various authors; published under the direction of Pierre Lellouche by IFRI, (Institut Francais des Relations Internationales) 415 pp]

[Text] For anyone who is not convinced by the explanations and the assurances of Chairman Brezhnev, the events in Afghanistan should mark an important date in the evolution of the relations between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world.

As I am neither a Kremlinologist nor a specialist in Asian problems, I will not try to determine the basic causes of this action by the last imperialist power of this end of the century. I will only note that this action follows logically on operations which, from North Korea to Cuba and Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Vietnam, and Cambodia, testify to the continuity of a design. Considerations of opportunism certainly played a role: a reply to the consolidation of the diplomatic position of China, following the Sino-Japanese treaty and the normalization of relations between Beijing and Washington; a favorable situation created by the events in Iran, underlining the vulnerability of the West to an energy crisis and the inability of the United States to free its diplomatic hostages; the abandonment of any hope of early ratification of the SALT II treaty; the political drift of the Amin government in Afghanistan. All these facts and many others certainly were weighed in the balance by the masters of the Kremlin.

However, if many elements were at the origin of the invasion of a vital region of the Asian continent by the Red Army, among which we cannot say which were the most important, the result is that, from this platform, it can keep two irons in the fire: keep things unstable and work against the territorial integrity of Pakistan, a country friendly to China and which the Soviet news agency TASS already accuses of being an obstacle to any political settlement of the crisis; or threaten the oil fields, without whose production the Western economy will break down. As has been said on many occasions, the strategy of the Soviet leaders is a global and indirect strategy.

It is global because, in the purely military definition of strategy, that is, the preparation and use of force for political ends, they have combined action in the political and ideological domains with the taking of control of positions which give them in Africa and in the Indian Ocean more facilities than the Western powers have.

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The only area where, up to the present, the USSR has not succeeded in making points against the countries of the free world is the economy. With a foreign trade amounting to 3 percent of total world trade, the Soviet means for exerting pressure on the West only bear on certain specific supplies, useful no doubt (petroleum, natural gas, titanium) but nevertheless too limited in scope or duration to give the Soviet Union a powerful means of leverage. Moreover, Soviet exports are more than largely compensated for by its own import needs.

The seizure of Afghanistan will not increase the resources available to Moscow. However, it will provide the means to exercise a potential threat to the very basis of the Western economy.

For the followers of the indirect strategy the progress achieved by the Soviets is essential. The art of the strategist, like that of the chess player (a more stimulating national game in intellectual terms than poker or bowling), consists in gaining the maximum with the minimum of means and of risks. To do that one has to have in all areas possible courses of action which will force one's opponent to draw back, after an evaluation of the balance of forces. This is what happened to Khrushchev at the time of the Cuban missile crisis and what the Soviets have sworn to themselves will not happen again.

By the occupation of Afghanistan the USSR is henceforth in a position to exercise in the economic sphere intolerable pressures on the countries with a liberal economy. This is the complementary resource which the Soviets lacked in terms of their global strategy.

Quite evidently, this does not mean that the Soviet Union will use this pressure to strangle the West. This is all the less likely since Washington has made it known that an attack on the free flow of petroleum exports from the Persian Gulf area would lead to war. However, unless one believes that the two superpowers are heading toward a kind of "super suicide," things won't happen that way in a period of crisis. Events will evolve, in all likelihood, toward an evaluation of the respective elements of power and of vulnerability. It is at this point that the Soviet presence in Kabul, in Aden, and in Addis Ababa constitutes a potential threat to the Westerners' very source of life. And if the analysis made by the men in the Politburo brings them to believe that capitalism has entered the final crisis predicted by the sacred texts of Marxism, one cannot ignore the possibility that one day they might be tempted to hasten the end of capitalism by an interruption in oil deliveries, if their evaluation of the facts of the problem leads them to conclude that the balance between risk and gain is favorable to them.

Even independently of a possible conflict, it is clear that the possibility the USSR would have, directly or indirectly, to put its hands on part of the petroleum production of the Persian Gulf, would have considerable economic importance for the Soviets. First of all, to meet their growing petroleum needs. Following that, to obtain substantial foreign exchange earnings if the countries falling under its control would continue to export to the West.

On the political plane the consequences would be no less important. If it should happen that the USSR can no longer, with its own resources, meet the energy needs

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of its satellites, the latter would be forced to obtain their supplies on the world market. Their resulting foreign payments problem would aggravate their present debt to the external world. For Moscow there would be a loss of a powerful lever of influence. Control of part of the production of the Near East would avoid this danger.

These considerations could therefore be added to the reasons arising from Soviet rivalry with the West to provoke a movement in the direction of the oil wells, more particularly in the northern area of the Persian Gulf.

In any case, on the strictly operational level, given the hypothesis of a conflict in Europe, the occupation of Afghanistan does not change much in terms of the problem of European defense. Since the completion of decolonization and the appearance of atomic weapons, the Western powers, in terms of their seapower, are no longer in a position to apply the strategic concept which gave them victory in the past: "giving up ground to gain time." (This is a concept which won out in the last world war, thanks, moreover, to the decisive participation of the Soviet Union, because its size let it apply the same principle.)

However, the effectiveness of this doctrine rests on the possession of resources, the control of the seas, and the time factor making it possible to bring the resources to bear, while a blockade forces the enemy to depend on its own resources. The control of resources has been lost, mastery of the seas would be challenged, and it is out of the question that a war in Europe could last beyond a few weeks. This means that war would be waged with what one would have at the beginning and that its outcome would no more depend on supplies of petroleum from the Middle East than it did in the past on the capacity of industry and shipyards in the United States to produce 50,000 aircraft and 10,000 Liberty ships after 3 years of war.

This confirms us in the view that the problem posed to us--and which the Afghanis-tan affair shows us in all its "purity"--is that of a strategy for a state of no-war. Now, it seems that there is a disturbing contrast between the approach to the problem in Moscow and in the Western countries.

We have said that the USSR is applying an indirect global strategy, to which the invasion of Afghanistan provides in part the economic dimension which was missing. Everything is happening as if the whole of international and national life were seen in Moscow in a context of confrontation (which does not mean conflict). Not only is the confrontation seen as inevitable and implacable but even desired, or perhaps better described as the thread of history, the very substance of which the present and the future are made.

It is not like that at all in the West. We have policies, and often grand policies, like the reconciliation between the former enemies of past wars, the construction of Europe, aid to the Third World, transformation of a style of living.

These are so many examples of a vision of the world which looks to the future. We also have defense policies for which we agree to make substantial sacrifices.

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However, as far as foreign policy and defense policy are concerned, it does not appear that our countries think of these problems in the context of a confrontation or, in any case, of a rivalry with an opposing group of countries which is following a strategy in the sense of a struggle to impose its political, economic, and social system.

Not only would the strategy followed in recent wars no longer be applicable, not only is it the case that the Atlantic Alliance has no concept of victory in the event of hostilities (it aims only at halting hostilities because of the danger of an escalation to extreme levels of conflict), but nothing would be more foreign to our vision of international relations than to consider them in the perspective in effect on the other side of the Elbe River. Our only overall concept is oriented on the hope that, over the long term, the differences in nature and objectives between the East and the West will wind up by blurring away on the single condition of increasing trade and contacts.

Our vision of the confrontation is exclusively military. Regarding our economic, cultural, scientific, and technological relations with the countries of the Warsaw Pact, we only see them in a perspective and in the service of detente. It is clear that we are not speaking the same language.

However, the events in Afghanistan have provoked reactions which lead one to think that it should be possible to benefit from them on condition that we take this view of two worlds in opposition to each other and not that we are preoccupied with returning as quickly as possible to the intellectual comfort of a resumption of detente. The feelings in the Muslim world, even in Iran under Ayatollah Khomeini, the unease felt by Indira Gandhi herself, the concern of Europe and of China, and the reawakening of the United States constitute a spectacular turnaround in the situation.

In such circumstances the French government certainly is right in not wishing to give to the countries which consider themselves non-aligned the impression that, if they condemn Moscow, they would necessarily agree with Western views of the situation. If, in the face of Fidel Castro's efforts, Marshal Tito succeeded once again in saving the Third World, at the Havana Conference, from an unconditional allegiance to Moscow, if Afghanistan aroused reactions which we have just recalled, it does not follow that the non-aligned should have the intention, for all of that, of seeming to move closer to the Westerners.

However, we can ask ourselves if it is appropriate to stimulate our reserve forces by the fear of a "resurgence of the power blocs." There is not and there never has been a power bloc in the West, and France, more than any other country, is best qualified to know this. When France wished to leave the integrated military organization [of NATO], when France asked the staffs and forces of its allies to leave its territory, it immediately obtained satisfaction. Even Greece was able to do the same thing, and as far as Turkey is concerned, it demanded and obtained the closure of the stations from which the United States observed the Soviet missile tests at the Baikonur base in Central Asia. Despite this, a reference to the policy of power blocs is part of our political phraseology. This is not only unjust in terms of the comparison which it seems to make between the relations of the free countries within the Atlantic alliance and the state of

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subordination which characterizes the relations between the satellite countries and the USSR. It can constitute an obstacle which we impose on ourselves in the evaluation of events concerning our security, if it is in the name of our independence that we limit the exercise of our independence. It is not certain that this is the best way of acting on the flow of events, in terms of the reactions of an American administration which, after having believed for too long a time in the virtue of a dialogue and in the good faith of the Soviets, risks going over to the opposite extreme.

How have we not shown the independence of our judgments, in the face of the converging points of view of the two superpowers, by refusing to approve of the SALT II agreement which, moreover, marks a deterioration in the overall balance of forces, in the detriment of the West!

Meanwhile, the Russians call on the policy of detente to attempt to prohibit the emplacement of missiles necessary for Europe's defense. They state, without being contradicted, that with 100 Pershing rockets having a range of 1,800 km the Americans would have a first strike capability, as opposed to the 1398 inter-continental missiles spread out through the immensity of Soviet territory! On the day after the entry of the Red Army into Afghanistan, they had the effrontery to say that the deployment of the Pershing missiles constituted "implicit aggression"! And the organization of Atlantic Alliance maneuvers in Norway was presented by PRAVDA as a policy of hostility toward the USSR!

Certainly, the Afghanistan affair has not placed our security in danger, over the short term, as the success of the Kremlin campaign against the Pershing missiles would have been. However, the two operations, placed in their present context, show the desire of the masters of Russia to extend their empire where they consider it necessary at the same time as they attempt to prohibit the modernization of Europe's defense systems.

There is another consequence of the Afghanistan affair which could have very profound and perhaps healthy repercussions on European security. That is the emerging awareness by the Westerners of the need to draw the appropriate consequences from the fact of their vulnerability to events occurring in the four corners of the world and the profound change that has taken place in the general circumstances affecting their security.

Up to and including World War II Europe was the center of the world and dragged the rest of the planet into its wars.

Since 1945 our continent has found itself in a very particular situation: no longer the center of the East-West confrontation, it has known the state of no-war and a feeling of security unknown until then. Certain countries, like ours, have been shaken by the pangs of decolonization. However, the state of peace in Europe has been really perturbed only by the wars between Israel and its neighbors, Vietnam, Soviet penetration in Africa, etc., not to mention the disturbance of our economies consequent on the repeated increases in the price of petroleum.

Now, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has come to change this view of things. Suddenly, we have realized that events taking place outside our geographic area

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would involve us in war. It is no longer we who threaten to drag the world into our wars, it is the problems and tensions developing thousands of kilometers from our borders which threaten to involve us in their warlike repercussions.

The first consequence that the European countries should draw from this is the need for them to increase their capabilities for intervention beyond their own continent. On this point France is far from being the country which is least aware of the problem. Its fleet on the high seas unquestionably has the capabilities of an ocean-going navy, and its rapid deployment forces are probably the best available in Europe.

Two facts must remain constant in our minds: the withdrawal of the British presence East of Suez when the London government, considering that it could not at the same time maintain a presence in the Indian Ocean and in Europe, sacrificed the overseas commitment for the benefit of the British Army of the Rhine. The other fact is the position in which Washington found itself when, in order to put two aircraft carriers in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf, it had to withdraw one from the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and one from the Seventh Fleet in the Pacific. There are therefore insufficient forces to hold several fronts at the same time. An increased rearmament effort, as a consequence of the overseas threat, is therefore necessary, independent of the programs adopted concerning security in Europe, and, as far as we are concerned, the modernization of our nuclear and conventional forces charged with the close-in defense of our territory is also necessary.

However, once the security of the European countries is threatened, not only on the continent but also overseas, it is necessary for them to be able to act in the defense of their interests. This is a matter, overall, of noting that we will not purchase our security by devoting between 2.5 and 4 percent of our gross national product to defense. We also have to recognize that there is no miracle formula which could compensate for the fact that the Soviets are now in a position to threaten the oil fields and the Straits of Ormuz and that they have logistical positions which would permit their ground and air forces to intervene there in a few hours. Thus, the demands by certain countries of the region for a withdrawal of the two superpowers or those tending to leave the Indian Ocean only to those countries on its shores, are they pretenses whose eventual acceptance would leave the field free to the sole influence of the USSR?

At the same time we understand the inadequacy of our structures and of our means of parrying the new dangers which threaten us. After we felt indignant at the statement made by Henry Kissinger that Europe only had regional interests, we noted that if our interests go beyond the framework of our region, our means of action hardly go beyond it. Depending almost entirely on the countries of the Persian Gulf for our supplies of petroleum, we also depend on the presence of the American Fleet to ensure the free movement of the oil tankers.

The Atlantic Alliance does not cover this region of the world which is vital for all the nations of the alliance and for many other countries, in the first rank of which is Japan. This geographic limitation which ensures that, beyond the Tropic of Cancer the allied commands have no further authority, may appear absurd. However, it is a fact, and there would be no political possibility of changing this state of things and of extending to the whole of the Atlantic Ocean and the Indian Ocean NATO's zone of responsibility.

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The problem had been posed in 1958 by General De Gaulle in the famous memorandum which he sent to President Eisenhower and to Prime Minister Macmillan of Great Britain. "The Atlantic Alliance," he wrote, "was conceived and its application was prepared for an eventual zone of action which no longer relates to the political and strategic realities. The world being what it is, we can no longer consider as adapted to its purposes an organization such as NATO, which is limited to the security of the North Atlantic Ocean, as if what is happening, for example in the Middle East or in Africa, did not immediately and directly involve Europe...." And he proposed a little further on, "that at the world political and strategic echelon an organization be established including the United States, Great Britain, and France," which would have the task "of establishing and, if necessary, of implementing strategic action plans, particularly involving use of nuclear weapons."

We know that this memorandum was not followed up and that, from this date on the process of estrangement of France from the integrated military organization began. Let us note in passing that France did not yet have nuclear weapons and that proposing a sharing of the decision to use American weapons was in conflict with what the general was himself to recognize later on, that is, that this is a responsibility which cannot be shared.

However, doesn't the rest of the reasoning have an astonishingly contemporary sound with the invasion of Afghanistan and the threat to the petroleum supply lines? Is it necessary to wait, as in the case of the Shaba area of Africa, for a crisis to be fully developed so that, in the event, France and the United States would agree on the logistical support which the latter would provide to the former or to examine in advance the possibilities of intervention and support? Do we still recall that at the time of the Yom Kippur War in 1973 only Portugal under Prime Minister Caetano agreed to authorize the landing of American planes in the Azores, bringing on an urgent basis the equipment Israel needed and that, without this help, only one-tenth as many American supplies would have been received.

If the Western governments recognize that the conquest of important geostrategic positions by the Soviet Union constitutes economic and military threats, they might usefully take up the idea presented in the 1958 memorandum.

Under what form and with what participation? Those are the points to be studied. No doubt, this should be done in the least official, least structured manner possible. Starting from the fact that the Westerners have to project elements of forces to points far away from their zone or where the bulk of their forces are located, it should be a matter of examining the possibilities which they would have of according each other facilities for stocking, transport, and communications, allowing the most rapid kind of intervention.

Naturally, there should be no question of establishing any kind of political organization requiring new commitments or of expanding to the whole planet the commitments of Article V of the Washington Treaty [the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949]. Instead, it would be a matter of preparing, in the military echelons and between the countries which have the capabilities and responsibilities of implementing a policy which is not exclusively regional in scope, the means for their governments to act beyond the geographic limits presently covered by the Atlantic Alliance if one day they

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consider it necessary. Let the Federal Republic of Germany and perhaps Italy be added to the three countries of which General De Gaulle was thinking. This would seem to be called for, the more so as in no case could there be any question of using nuclear weapons. Let us say, to be specific, that if American, French, British, and perhaps tomorrow German, Italian, and even Japanese naval forces are permanently stationed at the approaches to the Persian Gulf, it would be desirable that they are mutually aware of what their missions would be and what their resources would be to provide protection to the movement of petroleum tankers whenever there is a threat to these movements. It would be desirable if certain of the Western countries, which should not always involve the Americans, as we saw in the case of the Shaba affair already mentioned, were to undertake rapid redeployment of forces, were the transport available, facilities for stopovers en route, and stocking of supplies known in advance.

What the governments of the Western countries must decide is whether the invasion of Afghanistan is only "unacceptable" from the moral and international law point of view or whether it also constitutes a threat to the security of the peoples for whom they are responsible. If it is the second hypothesis which they decide on, the least that we can say is that we are not drawing the necessary conclusions from it.

Several months after the invasion of Afghanistan, it remains difficult to understand that our governments have not considered it useful to call immediately for a meeting at the ministerial level of the North Atlantic Council. Even a meeting of the foreign ministers of the United States, of the Federal Republic of Germany, of Great Britain, and of France, in the form of a working dinner, has not taken place, for reasons which remain all the more mysterious for most of us, since we have since then received Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Paris and met Chairman Brezhnev in Warsaw.

If we still need several crises like the invasion of Afghanistan in order to understand the nature of the threat to which we are exposed and to change our reflexes, there are still good times in prospect for the strategists of the Kremlin.

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

ECONOMIC, SOCIAL CRISIS: GREATEST SECURITY THREAT

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[Article by Lionel Jospin, national secretary of the Socialist Party for international relations. Section V, part 2 of new series, TRAVAUX ET RECHERCHES DE L'"IFRI". Vol 1 is "The Security of Europe in the 80's", various authors; published under the direction of Pierre Lellouche by IFRI, (Institut Francais des Relations Internationales) 415 pp]

[Text] The Iraq-Iran war, the events in Poland, the invasion of Afghanistan, the deployment of SS-20 medium range rockets, the decision to station Pershing rockets and cruise missiles in Europe--these are among the facts which, since the beginning of the year, indicate at times violently and in a disturbing way our entry into a new phase of international relations. Destabilized in depth by the emergence of the Third World on the international scene, marked by an economic and political crisis which is sparing very few industrialized countries, the old order based on a balance of power blocs is splitting up, but without a new international order emerging as yet. How will Europe pass through the present test--that Europe where the division of spheres of influence after World War II was marked with the greatest clarity and on which the economic and political crisis weighs with particular force? Will there be progress or regression? Today some people ask themselves about the security of Europe, as they spoke about its future, not so long ago. Is this a sign of legitimate disquiet or of a psychological and intellectual withdrawal?

It seems to me that the primary threat hanging over Europe, its balance, and its future is posed by the economic and social crisis which so many of the countries of Eastern and Western Europe are experiencing and the obstacles within the European Community, which has not known how to affirm its identity in the face of the great powers, up to now.

The aggravation of the unemployment problem, without inflation being brought under control, characterizes the economic situation in Western Europe. The adoption of policies to deal with the recession--with the notable exception of the Federal Republic of Germany but whose explicit policy of accepting a budgetary deficit is experiencing real difficulties--which are increasing social inequalities, and an attitude of fatalism among the people has its repercussions in the political and institutional field. The renaissance of reactionary and even racist ideologies, the emergence of acts of terrorism are accompanied by a move to the right and by questions regarding the role of political parties and of institutions which provide guarantees for democratic life.

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In the countries of Eastern Europe the feeling of stalemate in the bureaucratic societies there, which are also encountering a weakening of their economic capabilities already notably clogged by the low productivity of their productive apparatus and disorder in the distribution system, can lead to social explosions as a result of the refusal by their governments to accept a pluralistic system as an expression of social diversity. The events in Poland show how unavoidable is the process of evolution in these countries. However, they also show the risk of instability which evolution brings with it. To deal with the claims and dissatisfactions of the working classes and the respective peoples, a recourse to external adventures has often been a good recipe. All this is to say that the resolution of the internal problems of Europe and of each European country will be a major element in ensuring the security of Europe in the 1980's. That is why one of the main lines of orientation of the socialists is a refusal to accept the inevitability of a continuation of the crisis. Of course, these problems cannot be resolved by internal measures alone. The external environment of Europe will be an influence in a decisive way. It is therefore important to seek to control these external influences and particularly to define Europe's place in a world economy in the course of change.

Among others, the solutions chosen to make possible a reduction in the energy dependence of Europe, to expand its action in favor of the growth of the developing countries, and to negotiate the establishment of rules for an international economic order accepted by all will provide the design for the future of Europe.

The petroleum crisis is not the whole crisis, as it does not explain all of it. However, it makes it possible to see many facets of the crisis. Among them, we forget too often the attempts to restructure the world economy through the large, multinational firms. The crisis is also bringing out a new division on the international scene between the countries which produce or have petroleum (and among them are industrialized and Third World countries) and consuming countries (and those have different development levels).

However, rather than developing an overall policy based on the establishment of a new source of energy, France and Europe prefer to attempt to use in their favor the contradictions existing within OPEC, or profit from the possibilities opened up by the appearance of new producers "outside OPEC," such as Mexico. And each country, in trying to maintain its place or improve it, pays the political price of petroleum.

However, the increased efforts to save on energy, the broadened program of research on new sources of energy, and the decrease in the decline of coal production should, in France itself, reduce an excessive dependence on imported petroleum. More broadly, the negotiation of middle range petroleum development agreements with oil producing, developing countries and the adoption of joint planning programs, expanded to include all of Europe, should permit the stabilization of petroleum prices, whose erratic evolution is the most dangerous threat of all.

Farther afield, it is necessary to work actively on the development of the Third World countries. For socialists, there cannot be uncontrolled development by putting these countries in competition with each other. The struggle for a self-centered model program, giving priority to investments useful to all of the people,

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and in particular to agriculture, remains a necessity. This is the only way to ensure the real social progress of these countries and the development of social rights and freedoms which today are too often scorned. The exploitation of an under-paid and under-organized working force cannot provide a real base for development, progress, and stability.

These objectives cannot be pursued unless the economic rules are established and accepted by all countries engaged in international trade. The vagaries of the international monetary system, the absence of a consensus on its functioning, the difficulties which the United States has in resolving the internal problems of its economy without affecting the stability of the dollar--all of these circumstances maintain a state of permanent disquiet. And if the European Monetary System can have an effective role to play, its proper functioning remains too closely linked to deflationary policies to provide the basis for a new equilibrium.

If economic stability is a guarantee of our security, the threats to the security of Europe are also linked to the new armaments race, to the enhanced fragility of detente, to the demonstrations of force by the great powers and more particularly by the USSR, and to the indecisiveness in the foreign policies of all of the European countries.

The invasion of Afghanistan, coming after the deployment of the SS-20 missiles aimed at Western Europe, certainly give rise to suspicions regarding the willingness of the USSR to maintain an atmosphere of detente. The delays by the Senate and the Congress of the United States to ratify the SALT II accord* and the decision by NATO to emplace Pershing rockets also made these developments appear to reflect a certain hesitation by the United States about the course of detente. We are observing a crisis in detente signals, a reciprocal loss of confidence by the two great powers, a source of misunderstandings which is filled with danger. The growing misunderstanding--but things are not irreversible--between the USSR and the United States, and their desire to reaffirm their hegemony over the world today, constitute the greatest threat of all.

Any policy of force presupposes that the country which commits itself to it is calculating for itself the risks which its actions involve. The USSR must know that the Europeans are not disposed to accept, especially in the name of a flouted kind of detente, any demonstration of power which is dangerous for peace. It is important to show our capacity to preserve our independence. The legitimacy of the pose of the USSR as a defender of peace has been largely placed in question. It would be absurd not to turn back to it the burden of proof regarding its declared objectives. The USSR has often emphasized the ideological struggle, and we have not hesitated to take our place on this ground. The impasses which have developed within the Soviet bureaucratic system and the inability of the system to guarantee individual and collective liberties still remain. A France which knows how to commit itself and to bring Europe along to the establishment of a more just, more egalitarian, freer, and more independent society may constitute a point of reference which will go beyond the traditional East-West cleavages and which refuses to consider the division of Europe accepted at Yalta as definitive.

*These delays make the discussion of SALT III a relative matter. For our part we think that if France can participate in them, it must be considered as speaking in its own name, its nuclear striking force being considered as an autonomous entity.

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As for now, we need to show our determination to develop our means of defense, without letting ourselves be dragged into a kind of competitive system which stimulates the armaments race. Thus, the socialists are proposing the building of a sixth nuclear submarine and the carrying out of research on the neutron weapon (but excluding series production of it).

The autonomous capacity of France to defend itself and to make the related decisions must also be assured in relationship to the United States. The present process of strengthening NATO (redeployment in Turkey, partial reintegration of Greece, a decision on membership of the Spanish government) will have a major effect on the northern shores of the Mediterranean. This cannot be a factor favoring real detente, the more so since the criteria which are leading to this development remain unknown. Elsewhere, the principles on which the Atlantic Alliance rests, the nature of the reciprocal commitments are factors which remain uncertain. The United States has not been able or has not wished to associate its allies with its decisions (the case of the boycott of the Olympic Games and reprisals against the USSR after the invasion of Afghanistan are known; the geographic sphere of activity of the Atlantic Alliance is not fully known).

No doubt it is also time, as President Francois Mitterrand has said, to review the nature of the reciprocal commitments of the Atlantic Alliance.

Certainly, the development of nuclear weapons and their miniaturization raises in a new way the problem of military alliances. Without going so far as to state, with Herman Kahn and A. Weiner that "coalition and nuclear threats are two contradictory concepts," because of the fact of the enormous risks run by too strict a commitment toward an ally, we can legitimately consider that the idea of making one's national territory into a sanctuary can only be decided by each country. Hence the unavoidable logic of the eventual development by each country of nuclear weapons, if we do not succeed in putting an end to the arms race. For us also, military security cannot really include true security. Only a resumption of disarmament negotiations can really ensure our security. The present situation demands as a prior condition that the conditions for a return to the spirit of detente must be present. The conference in Madrid--and that is why we hope for its success--could be the occasion for this. In any case it will be a test of the intentions of both sides. Possible objectives in Madrid would be avoiding having the conference in Madrid bog down in preparing a balance sheet--necessary and indeed indispensable as that may be--regarding the application of the Helsinki accords and proposing further advances in the three "baskets" (which are inseparable for us) in order to make it possible to resume the advance with the kind of confidence necessary for detente. If the Madrid conference furthermore makes it possible to go further toward a conference on the reduction of forces and tensions in Europe, such as Francois Mitterrand proposed in December, 1977--which presupposes that all kinds of armaments be discussed--we would rejoice. However, this involves a further step which presupposes that the other steps have also been taken.

The security of Europe will not be achieved by decree. It must be built up. In a world where the dialogue between the superpowers is jammed up, where the emergence of the Third World countries will lead them to assert themselves, including by means of war, it is important that Europe, and each of the countries which compose

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it, should appear as an independent point of reference, of stability, of innovation. It is a new dynamism which must be achieved. To do that it will be necessary to give back confidence in Europe to France, to give back to the youth of our country reasons to hope and to live for. If confidence in the leaders of our country, in its institutions, continues to deteriorate under the impact of scandals and the loss of civic spirit, the ability to mobilize the French for a project looking to the future will be extinguished. Looking to the future provides the basis for a strong demographic position and for economic and social progress. For the socialists, there cannot be a coherent foreign policy except in terms of its relationship with domestic policy. There cannot be external security without a resolution of the internal problems of each country, ensuring the stability and progress of each society. This is the direction of our program.

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

SALT II, III; ARMS CONTROL, NOT DISARMAMENT

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[Article by Xavier Defline, an officer in the French armed services. Section VI, part 1 of new series, TRAVAUX ET RECHERCHES DE L'IFRI. Vol 1 is "The Security of Europe in the 80's", various authors; published under the direction of Pierre Lellouche by IFRI, (Institut Francais des Relations Internationales) 415 pp]

[Text] The refusal of France to participate in the SALT III negotiations is not a position of principle taken on an a priori basis. This refusal is based on an analysis of the preceding SALT negotiations, their objectives, their significance, and their results. This position was also developed from an evaluation of the advantages and risks which the extension of these negotiations to theater-level weapons would involve for the security of Europe.

Which Negotiation?

The negotiation to which we refer under the name of SALT III does not yet have a very precise meaning, and its objectives remain somewhat blurred. If NATO has tried to learn the outlines more exactly, it is far from having obtained Soviet agreement on the bases which the organization proposes. What would this negotiation be? A prolongation of SALT II or a negotiation on European strategy? A response is not yet available.

A Prolongation of SALT II

Initially, SALT III was considered to be a prolongation and a logical step after the preceding agreements. This new phase of the negotiation in effect was intended, according to the terms of the declaration of principle attached to the SALT II agreement, to continue bilateral discussions with a view to achieving the following objectives:

--conclude with significant and substantial reductions in the number of offensive, strategic weapons;

--adopt qualitative limitations on the deployment of new types of weapons and on the modernization of existing weapons;

--find a solution to the questions set out in the interim protocol attached to the treaty.

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These negotiations were to be conducted by paying particular attention to the most destabilizing, strategic weapons, with the purpose of reducing the risks of surprise attack and by taking into consideration the factors which determine the strategic situation. This last, very ambiguous formula reveals the reservations of the Soviet Union, which most certainly intended to see finally taken into consideration the demand which it had made from the beginning of the SALT conversations. That is, taking into consideration all weapons capable of striking the territory of one or the other of the parties. From its point of view the following weapons should become a part of the negotiation:

--the American weapons deployed in Europe whose radius of action is sufficient to make it possible for them to strike the territory of the USSR (Forward Based Systems)*;

--the nuclear forces of third countries, and particularly those of France and the United Kingdom, allies of the United States.

Regarding these last two points, the minimum objective of the Soviet Union seemed to be that, in the absence of an agreement establishing a ceiling for these systems, Eastern Europe might benefit, in the calculation of its own ceilings, from a kind of compensation equivalent to the threat which these systems represent. Of course, and in terms of rigorous logic, the Soviet Union did not intend to see limitations imposed on its own medium range systems, since the latter did not have the range necessary to strike American territory.

Or Taking Into Account European Concerns

Things were shown in a completely new light, at least in the Western camp, following the speech of Chancellor Schmidt at the Institute of Strategic Studies in London on 28 October 1977. The latter viewed the parity provided for by the SALT II agreements as involving a form of reciprocal neutralization by the two great powers at the strategic level, affecting everything which did not put their own survival in question. He drew attention to the growing danger which, correspondingly, the imbalance in theater-level weapons constituted, the more so as the Soviets were in the course of deploying weapons of a new type, the SS-20 missile and the Backfire bomber.

It was with the objective of limiting the deployment of these new weapons that NATO studied an action program composed of two stages closely dependent on each other. The first stage consisted in strengthening and modernizing the middle range arsenal of NATO, and the second stage was to use this modernization decision to encourage the Soviets to negotiate seriously the limitation of their own weapons at the theater level. This negotiation had initially been conceived by the Federal Republic of Germany as pertaining to theater-level weapons. However, this idea was rapidly abandoned in favor of an overall approach, fitting better into the extension of the SALT conversations and avoiding making it appear that this was like a search for a balance at the European strategic level.

*The 160 or so fighter-bombers of the F-111 type based in Great Britain and the aircraft embarked on ships of the Sixth Fleet.

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In the mind of the NATO leaders this new phase of negotiations therefore was to remain strictly limited to the nuclear weapons of the United States and the Soviet Union, and for this reason could only be conducted in a bilateral framework. However, the range of the negotiations was to be broadened, so that it would also cover theater-level weapons, or at least in the initial phase the most destabilizing weapons among them. The objective would be to end with a strategic balance more stable due to its being broader, covering all its extensions at the theater level. Thus, it would be a matter of acting in such a way that neither of the two super-powers could subsequently benefit from any kind of advantage, either at the geographic level or at an intermediate level of escalation, which would allow it to place in question the overall balance. This way of presenting things made it possible to avoid the problem of the specific balance of the European theater. That was an important point. In effect NATO denied seeking such a balance for itself, because this would come down to recognizing the weakening of the American strategic guarantee and the need to find a substitute for it in order to ensure the security of Western Europe. However, as the negotiation was to give priority to theater-level, medium-range weapons considered the most destabilizing, it appeared inevitable that the limitations of which they would be the object would take the form of a European sub-ceiling, with all the consequences which the beginning of a European strategic balance would thus see appear.

Although this concerned a bilateral negotiation, the member countries of NATO considered that they should be indirectly associated with it, since finally it is their own security which is involved. As a consequence they created a consultative structure which should permit them to define the principles on which the conduct of the negotiation will be oriented and to follow the course of the conversations. Thus they consider that they will be able to present a united front and strengthen the American hand regarding the Soviets.

The Soviet View of the Negotiation

The uneasiness shown in Western Europe and the proposal to open new negotiations were all the better perceived in Moscow as they were accompanied by a program for the modernization of theater-level weapons which irritated the Soviets. The response given by Chairman Brezhnev in his speech in Berlin on 6 October 1979 indicated that, "The Soviet Union is ready to reduce in terms of its present level the number of medium range nuclear weapon launchers stationed in the Western regions of the USSR, but only on condition that no further medium range nuclear weapon launchers are stationed in Western Europe."

In the mind of the Soviets, it could not only be a matter of a freeze of NATO weapons but also must include the French and British strategic forces. Moreover, the communique of the Warsaw Pact countries published on 6 December 1979 clearly called on the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance to participate in a European strategic conference on the limitation of theater-level weapons. Further, in his speech on 6 October, Brezhnev refuted the accusations made by NATO, according to which the USSR was seeking to achieve superiority in Europe. As proof that its strategy, on the contrary, was defensive, he stated that over the previous 10 years the number of medium range missiles, the number of aircraft, and the total power of the throw-weight had been somewhat reduced.

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In fact the Soviet Union considers--and that comes out in the statements made later by Foreign Minister Gromyko and Marshal Ustinov--that a balance already exists in Europe, if one takes into account the French and British forces, and which was implicitly recognized by the SALT II agreements. That is why the Soviet Union condemns the program for modernization of NATO weapons as constituting a resumption of the armaments race and a reflection of the new aggressive attitude of the Americans. According to the Soviet Union the Americans were reportedly seeking to overturn the strategic situation in Europe in favor of NATO and at the same time, "to bring near the frontiers of the USSR new medium range systems intended to fulfill strategic tasks," which in reality would constitute by-passing the SALT II agreements. The NATO countries were also accused of "transforming Europe into a launching ramp for American strategic weapons aimed at the territory of the USSR," and they were threatened with the counter-blow of Soviet reactions if they persisted with their intentions.

The warning is clear: if the negotiation can be undertaken, it can only be on the basis of the present situation, but not on the basis of the position of strength which NATO is seeking to acquire as a preliminary.

After the Modernization Decision of 12 December 1979

However, NATO found itself obliged to ignore the Soviet warning and to show its determination by giving concrete form to its proposals, lacking which it would have lost not only its credibility but also the means to exert pressure on the USSR and the advantages which it needed in order to hope to negotiate with success. The decision reached on 12 December 1979 in Brussels to undertake a program for the deployment in Europe of 108 Pershing II rockets and of 464 cruise missiles was certainly essential to preserve the credibility of NATO. However, it no less allowed the lack of determination of several of its members to appear. In response the Soviet reaction was rather brutal, since it consisted in pointing out to NATO that, by its attitude, it had destroyed the bases for a negotiation but that the negotiation could be considered again if the modernization decision was put off or at least its application were deferred.

However, at first certain European countries continued to hope that the Soviet Union would reconsider such a determined position and that it would end by overtures making it possible to begin discussions. However, a second obstacle emerged with the intervention of the Red Army in Afghanistan, which profoundly upset the conditions for an East-West dialogue. The hardening American position, which led to deferring ratification of the SALT II agreements, reflected a profound disenchantment with the policy of detente and the process of arms control. The European countries, once their first reaction of protest was over, now sought rather to preserve what could be saved of detente in Europe, but their wish to fill in the gap which separated the Russians and the Americans was not enough to lead the latter to take up again the theme of negotiations where they had been halted and on the same bases.

The situation seems to have begun to thaw, at least on the side of the Soviet Union since the recent trip of Chancellor Schmidt to Moscow. Brezhnev in effect proposed, without waiting for the ratification of the SALT II agreements, immediately beginning negotiations between the Americans and the Soviets on medium range weapons.

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The specific contents of this offer of negotiations are not yet very clear, but we can ask ourselves what are the basic motives which led the Soviets to so noticeable a change in direction. Perhaps they intended to make trouble in the Western camp by strengthening the position of those who would like to give priority to negotiations on the modernization of theater-level weapons and thus to raise indirectly once more the decision of 12 December 1979? Perhaps this was also a maneuver aimed at separating the negotiation on theater-level weapons from the SALT process and thus strengthening the perception of no linkage with the American central systems.

Why France Will Not Participate in the SALT III Negotiation

France has adopted an attitude of attentive reserve regarding the process of development of the SALT III talks. France has no intention, and the president has clearly stated this, of participating in any way in this new negotiation. It is not so much because France does not feel itself concerned by the arrangements which would be reached in the negotiation but rather because the objectives which will be sought there are rather far removed from French objectives and because France risks losing in part its independence and freedom of action which are indispensable to its security.

A Language Which Is Not Ours

The SALT negotiations were originally considered to be an instrument making it possible to transfer the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union to a plane where this confrontation would give place to the notion of detente or of peaceful coexistence, with the possibility of establishing Soviet-American relations on quasi-contractual bases.

The two superpowers were preoccupied by the rivalry which opposed them and which involved, if not the triumph of one or the other, at least the preservation of their respective prestige in terms of the rest of the world. They therefore sought to reach agreement on rules of good conduct, based on the respect for their responsibilities as superpowers, which would permit both of them to preserve their status and their interests, while limiting the effort necessary to reach that goal.

This logic of the strong speaking to the strong, included in their respective strategies, remained the key thread in their negotiations in SALT I and then SALT II. They did not see, therefore, why this kind of logic would not be applied as well in the future negotiations in SALT III. Now France, whose strategy of the weak country acting against the strong one and whose disposition remains strictly defensive, could not participate in SALT III without speaking a totally different language. It is doubtful that this language would have the slightest chance of being heard, since our country would only amount to a negligible quantity in what would be a game between the United States and the Soviet Union.

France has no interest in getting involved in a dialogue which has been established to satisfy the interests of the two great powers first. If it did take part, it would have to accept rules of the game not in its interest. It could only make the most of it by serving as a guarantor of an effort which would be beyond its reach.

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Arms Control and Not Disarmament

The SALT negotiations have had the single result up to the present of slowing down the qualitative and quantitative competition between the United States and the Soviet Union and perhaps to make the future less uncertain for them. However, the SALT negotiations have certainly not made it possible to begin true nuclear disarmament; quite the contrary. In effect the reduction of about 250 strategic weapons delivery systems which, according to the terms of the SALT II agreement, the Soviet Union would have to agree to before 1 January 1981 cannot mask the fact that the Soviets, while strictly respecting the terms of the agreement, could, between now and 1985, easily increase the number of its nuclear warheads by nearly 50 percent. And it is necessary to emphasize that the number of nuclear warheads is probably the most representative criterion of their overall nuclear potential. Although in a lesser proportion, the same is true for the United States, and we can take it for granted, considering the alarmist reactions which have been expressed on the other side of the Atlantic regarding the contents of the SALT II accords, that these possibilities will be broadly exploited.

The process of arms control can certainly list to its credit the normalization of relations between the superpowers for a time. It has given us the hope of making the future easier to foresee, but it has demonstrated its limits in connection with recent events which have made it clear that the Soviet Union never abandoned any of its initial ambitions. Nevertheless, the parties involved in arms control believed that they could rely on the results obtained to consolidate the policy of nuclear non-proliferation. For its part the Soviet Union believes it has every reason to invite the other nuclear powers to agree to limit their own forces. However, there is a fundamental difference between the act of establishing a ceiling for nuclear forces at a largely super-abundant level, as is the case presently for the two superpowers, and establishing a ceiling which is just barely sufficient, as would be the case with the other nuclear powers.

The United States and the Soviet Union in reality have huge nuclear arsenals, all out of proportion to their strict needs for security and which are justified principally by the need to meet the challenge of their adversary and to concede nothing to him in terms of military power. For France, on the other hand, which carries out a strategy of dissuasion of the weak power opposed to the strong power, there can be no question of accepting the least limitation on its strategic armaments, once the latter are exactly of the right dimensions to ensure its security. Unlike the two great powers, France does not have a surplus nuclear capability which is negotiable. Neither is any constraint acceptable for the future, as long as the threat which France must face continues to evolve and to put France under the obligation of improving its strategic forces to maintain their credibility.

Finally, France has no moral obligation to enter this negotiation, since its nuclear potential represents a very small percentage of the existing arsenals. On the basis of this fact one cannot seriously pretend that the French nuclear arsenal constitutes a threat of a destabilizing kind for any party.

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Occupying a Seat: to Do What?

It is certain that France will be under pressure, particularly from the Soviet Union, to participate in these discussions, or that in its absence its nuclear forces will be indirectly taken into account in the calculation of the ceilings recognized for the two parties. In these conditions some people think that it would be in France's interest to come to the conference table, because there is no better way for France to be able to defend its interests appropriately.

That is not a very realistic way of looking at the situation because, if we act in this way, our first demand should be to have a ceiling for nuclear weapons recognized for us which would be sufficiently large, compared to our present arsenal, to preserve the possibility of carrying out our future programs. Can one reasonably hope that the Soviets would agree to this demand, when at the same time they would be under pressure to agree to reductions of their medium range weapons? And even if these Soviet reductions were accompanied by an equivalent reduction of American weapons, the Soviet Union could not agree that the other European powers would keep full latitude to increase their own potential, the more so since France and Great Britain, as members of the Atlantic Alliance, should naturally, in the view of the Soviet Union, have their forces added to those of the United States. The Soviet conception of security requires it to have forces capable of guaranteeing it against a potential coalition of all of the countries not belonging to the socialist camp. The Soviet Union does not seem ready to accept constraints which do not satisfy this need.

The quantitative freeze of all medium range, theater-level weapons, of such nature as to maintain this situation, seems to be the first objective which the Soviets have set out for themselves before beginning the reduction phase. That point comes out clearly in the Brezhnev statement of 6 October 1979. However, since such a freeze is completely unacceptable for France, as well as any other form of concession, moreover, it would appear to be totally sterile to take part in a negotiation where we could only present demands to the other parties without being able to concede anything in exchange.

Search for an Impossible Balance

Although its advocates deny it, the SALT III negotiation could only drift progressively toward the search for a balance that would specifically apply to the European theater and which would be juxtaposed alongside a new parity for the central American and Soviet systems.

We can remain skeptical regarding the prospects of ending with a satisfactory result for at least three reasons:

--the first arises from the very great variety of weapons now on hand. One could not limit oneself to taking into account only medium range weapons, without running the risk of seeing the question arise of eventual destabilization by means of weapons with a shorter range. How would it be possible to determine the relative importance of the different kinds of nuclear weapons and to take into account the diversity of their missions?

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--the second comes from the need to take into account the fact that France and Great Britain constitute autonomous decision-making centers and that it will no doubt be difficult to set out the terms of a balance having four components.

--the third finally results from the fact that the effectiveness of nuclear weapons does not relate so much to their intrinsic characteristics as to the way in which they are used. In this respect the asymmetry of existing strategies will remain a fundamental element of the imbalance. This is because the Soviet Union, which holds to a resolutely offensive and pre-emptive doctrine, will always have, even with equal weapons, the possibility of acquiring an immediate advantage over its adversary by taking the initiative.

Playing the Game of the Soviet Union

In the present political situation of Europe it is no doubt appropriate to seek to negotiate security conditions proper to this theater, because this would mean accepting the risk of making even clearer the asymmetry of the respective strategic postures.

In facing up to Soviet power, which is dominant and physically present in Europe, most of the Western countries are totally dependent for their security on the guarantees expressed by the United States, which belongs to another continent and for whom the stakes will not have the same value as they do for the USSR, or even for the allies of the United States.

The Soviet Union, which has a greater belief in the balance of forces between nations than in the virtue of negotiations, nevertheless has understood how much profit it could obtain from the conduct of the SALT negotiations, in the sense of projecting the image of a nation which is strong, resolute, and implacable in a negotiation. The position which the Soviet Union has acquired today, and which relates first to a formidable accumulation of military power, makes it possible for it to exert pressure on the member countries of NATO to undertake the SALT III negotiations (or negotiations on European strategy) in the sense which seems most in conformity with Soviet interests.

The Soviets will seek to reduce progressively the dominant influence of the United States in Western Europe and to seize upon every opportunity making it possible to weaken the American strategic guarantee. In this regard the prospect of this new negotiation for the Soviet Union is all the more attractive as the particular sensitivity of the European members of NATO will let the Soviet Union play upon their divisions and vulnerabilities in order to begin a direct dialogue with them, on the periphery of the dialogue begun with the United States.

For its part France has no reason to lend itself to such a process if it amounts to facilitating the game of the Soviet Union and permitting it, in time, to resolve the security problem in Europe to its satisfaction.

If France shows so clearly its refusal to participate in the SALT III talks, that does not mean that France refuses to make its contribution to the nuclear disarmament effort, which appears necessary for world security, today more than ever.

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However, it cannot be denied that the results achieved by the United States and the Soviet Union, in their effort to limit armaments, are quite insufficient for France to feel bound to engage itself in turn on the course of negotiations which might lead it to mortgage its security for the future, but without having the two superpowers accept the same risk for themselves.

It is necessary to note that, after more than 10 years of negotiations, the armaments race, which one hoped was at the point of slowing down, on the contrary seems to be beginning again on a spiral that is all the more dangerous as it escapes rational analysis. The balances of forces, as they are perceived, analyzed, and dissected today, too often reduce to an abstraction the destructive power of the nuclear weapon and the considerable capacities accumulated on both sides which guarantee to each a largely superfluous capacity to destroy the enemy under all circumstances, even after having suffered a first, pre-emptive strike. The reasoning built around artificial scenarios makes it possible to justify the need to increase certain aspects of strategic capability by the deployment of new systems of weapons. However, these reduce to an abstraction, in most cases, the marginal character, even the unrealistic character, of the gains so achieved when one reasons in strict terms of military capability.

The reality is that the formidable nuclear potential which the United States and the USSR have makes any undertaking which could lead them to the edge of a direct confrontation extremely perilous and probably unacceptable. When one begins with the level of power achieved which is already huge, the question is no longer to know which of the two countries is superior to the other. The true question is to know which of the two will know how to exploit its military power more effectively in the political arena. It is there that the true imbalance is found. For the Soviet Union, firmly led by an undivided government, can concentrate all its forces in the service of a prudent but determined strategy and exploit without hesitation every opportunity offered to it. Meanwhile, it only has facing it a divided West, whose leadership is no longer assured of a firm hand from the United States, which is entangled in its doubts and contradictions.

The SALT negotiations perhaps are not responsible for this situation, although they have contributed to maintaining the illusion that it was possible to bring the Soviet Union to conform to the model of moderation proposed by the Americans. The disillusionment resulting from the discovery of the reality of the Soviet Union and the psychosis which pushes the West to seek its security in a new armament effort no doubt are not a consequence of the policy of "arms control." Nonetheless, the fact remains that "arms control" has been found to be incapable of halting the pernicious process which leads to a reverse effect of what it sought, that is, the resumption of an arms effort in place of disarmament.

The reality is that the confrontation which sets the United States and the Soviet Union against each other, despite the appearances of peaceful coexistence, remains, at least in the mind of the Soviets, a test of strength. In the Soviet view negotiation for them is only a means of revealing the evolution of the balance of forces to their advantage.

In such a scenario, where humanitarian preoccupations seem to be quite absent, one can doubt that the opening of a new phase of negotiations, called SALT III, in the

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present circumstances, can provide a significant contribution to the cause of disarmament. Moreover, the parties to the negotiation are thinking first of all of strengthening their positions--the Russians, by the deployment of the SS-20 and the Backfire bomber, and the Americans, by the deployment of long range, theater-level weapons--before sitting down at the negotiating table.

For things to go differently, pressure from the international community would have to be sufficiently strong and coherent to force the two great powers to go beyond the rivalry which opposes each to the other and understand that their status as great powers could suffer from general condemnation and the rejection of their influence over part of the world. However, that is a totally different perspective whose basic assumptions have not yet been established.

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POLITICAL

SPAIN

CALVO-SOTELO, SUAREZ BID FOR CONTROL UNDERMINING UCD'S CHANCES

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 14 Sep 81 pp 28, 29, 31

[Article by Antxon Sarasqueta]

[Text] Most of the question marks surrounding the tensions that are jolting the UCD [Democratic Center Union] and conditioning the course of the Calvo-Sotelo administration have to do with the disagreement between the head of the Executive Branch and his predecessor, ruling party strongman Adolfo Suarez.

The increasingly hard-line stand by Suarez and his men in recent weeks comes at a time when a government crisis is anticipated because of the incorporation of independents, hastened by the resignation of Justice Minister Francisco Fernandez Ordonez.

This magazine has heard prominent Suarez backers contend that forming a splinter group or breaking up the party would be preferable to having the government lead the party towards positions that are far removed from what they regard as "their" UCD. These men accuse Calvo-Sotelo of directing a move to the right in UCD policy.

Suarez and his men are not ready to give up the organization franchise and the green-flame "donuts" symbolizing the party, even though it might mean splitting or breaking up the UCD. This is their heavy wager.

Suarez continues to control most of the party through its leadership bodies and, therefore, holds the key to drawing up the electoral lists.

The fact that Suarez, at one of the UCD leadership's recent meetings, suggested the formation of an election committee (as the party's bylaws stipulate) consisting almost entirely of his confidants, gives us an idea of the position of strength that the former president holds.

The committee will consist of five persons. In accordance with Suarez's offer, they would be the president and secretary general of the ruling party plus three others selected by the Executive Committee.

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This formula would make it practically impossible for Calvo-Sotelo to appear on the electoral lists or would bind him hand and foot as prime minister to the interests of the Suarez faction, which comes down to the same thing.

In this context, the possibility of leading independent figures joining the new government (such as Antonio Garriguez Walker), the authorization of private television and membership in NATO are government projects that clearly bear the stamp of Calvo-Sotelo and have highlighted Suarez's opposition to the prime minister's policies.

Here is where the Executive Committee, under the influence of the Suarez people, is doing some tough ideological screening of the government projects that Calvo-Sotelo has submitted. This has conditioned the administration's efforts, to the point that it has taken a step backwards in authorizing private television.

As Suarez continues to pressure Calvo-Sotelo, men such as former ministers Rafael Arias and Fernando Abril are the ones who are taking the hard-line stands beside the former prime minister, even more hard-line than those Suarez himself has voiced, as one of the ministers on the Calvo-Sotelo team admitted to CAMBIO 16.

These attacks and pressures on Calvo-Sotelo contrast with the support that the prime minister is receiving from other party factions, which, however, are poorly represented in the UCD's decision-making bodies and in the economic and financial spheres.

Calvo-Sotelo is the only UCD figure today whom financial groups are willing to back with the 4 billion pesetas that the party needs to run in the upcoming general elections with a chance of winning.

In these economic and financial circles Calvo-Sotelo enjoys a high standing, which has been enhanced in recent months by his performance as prime minister. To judge by opinion polls, the public also has a positive opinion of him so far.

In pursuing his strategy of "modernizing" the UCD by making it a party of representative factions and bringing in prestigious figures who are now labeled independents (a sort of secret coalition), the prime minister has the backing of Christian Democrats and Liberals within the party.

Nevertheless, the key man when the time comes to tip the scale in Suarez's or Calvo-Sotelo's favor could be the current minister of territorial administration, Rodolfo Martin Villa.

Martin Villa is Suarez's stabilizer in controlling the party's nationwide structure and he exerts great influence over wideranging sectors of the administration, both because of his track record and the team with which he surrounds himself.

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This means that Martin Villa could be a decisive man in the government for Calvo-Sotelo, although the fact is that at present he is not one of his closest confidants.

When Fernandez Ordonez's resignation triggered a crisis, the prime minister consulted only with ministers Pio Cabanillas and Jose Pedro Perez-Llorca in his office, and this gave rise to mistrust and bad feelings in the minister of territorial administration, who reacted by moving towards Suarez again.

After a period of confrontation with Suarez during the UCD provincial elections before the summer vacation, Martin Villa once again hooked up with his former prime minister last week.

The two UCD leaders met for lunch in the minister's office and analyzed the party's situation for 3 hours. In the context of the current UCD infighting, this should be interpreted as a warning to Calvo-Sotelo from the minister of the autonomies.

However, Martin Villa, along with the Christian Democrats and without the opposition of Social Democrat Fernandez Ordonez, supports one of the moves in Calvo-Sotelo's strategy: bringing independents into the next administration.

In spite of Calvo-Sotelo's denial that a ministerial crisis is in the offing, a maneuver designed to dampen tensions in light of upcoming parliamentary debate on crucial issues for the administration such as the "colza case" and NATO, government sources close to the prime minister agree that there will be one shortly, probably after the Galician regional elections on 20 October.

Independents in Government

As far as cabinet changes are concerned (the replacement of Jesus Sancho Rof as minister of labor, health and social security is considered a sure thing, as well as some other minister implicated in the "colza case"), there is still an emphasis on bringing in well-known independents, in spite of the opposition of the Suarez people as announced by Fernando Abril.

Sources close to Calvo-Sotelo and that can exert major influence in the negotiations under way at the top echelon of the ruling party, admitted to CAMBIO 16 that the prime minister still intends to do this.

The makeup of the new cabinet will be the most visible indication of what kind of maneuvering ability the prime minister has within the UCD and how he is going to utilize the leverage of power to push forward with his goals and bolster his own position.

One of the steps that the prime minister has to take to feel more secure is to bring in prestigious independents who support his political programs and his plans for the party.

The only way that he can do this is by having more of a say in determining the election lists than he has under the current circumstances in UCD leadership bodies, which are mostly controlled by Adolfo Suarez.

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With general elections looming in 1982, the time factor is another handicap for Calvo-Sotelo. Until the 23 February coup trials begin (they are scheduled for March or April of next year), the very shakiness of our democracy will serve to restrain not only the opposition but also any move within the UCD itself that might jeopardize the continuity of the government.

The most widely held view is that from that point on and after an extremely delicate period, both the opposition and ruling party factions are going to take more radical tacks, which would make an agreement on the future of the UCD even more difficult.

The panorama facing the prime minister is obviously quite difficult: there is internal party opposition to him (in spite of all the conciliatory documents that are made public), and opposition party pressure will mount as Parliament opens.

- A resolution of this tense situation of confrontation that has triggered a UCD crisis and that transcends the ruling party in its impact obviously hinges on a Calvo-Sotelo-Suarez pact. The prime minister's strategy at present is to reverse the balance of power between him and Suarez so that he does not have to continue bargaining from a position of weakness.

- If such agreements are not hammered out, other possibilities might come into play across the country's political spectrum. In point of fact, the ruling party would begin breaking up just a few months before the general elections, which would certainly enhance the Socialist Party's chances of gaining power.

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MILITARY

FRANCE

AS15TT ANTISHIP MISSILE TEST-FIRED FIRST TIME

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 5 Sep 81 p 49

[Article: "First Test Flight of AS15TT Missile"]

[Text] Aerospatiale has just released a photograph of the new light AS15TT antiship missile's first test flight made in late June at the Mediterranean Test Center (CEM) on the Ile du Levant. This first test firing of the complete missile verified the weapon's performance in both range and speed, and tested its roll control and low-altitude altimeter guidance systems. The sea-skimming missile was fired from a fixed launcher installed on the coast of the Ile du Levant. Aerospatiale reported that the missile successfully completed this trial flight.

At the same time, the Agrion 15 maritime search and target-tracking radar, developed by Thomson-CSF for the AS15TT weapon system, was undergoing tests at the Gavres test range near Lorient in Brittany where the high level of shipping activity facilitates such testing. It will be recalled that the light AS15TT antiship missile is being developed, with Aerospatiale's Tactical Missiles Division functioning as prime contractor, as part of the "Sawari" contract awarded France by Saudi Arabia last year. This contract calls for the acquisition of frigates equipped with Aerospatiale Dauphin helicopters armed with AS15TT missiles, in addition to the naval version of Thomson-CSF's Crotale surface-to-air missile and Matra's Otomat antiship missiles. Saudi Arabia is the first purchaser of the new AS15TT weapon system to be delivered beginning in 1984.

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MILITARY

FRANCE

BRIEFS

ILLEGAL SOLDIERS' COMMITTEES--A navy conscript, Patrick Le Trehondat, will henceforth carry out the duties of secretary-general of the IDS [Information on Soldiers' Rights]. Allied with the CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor], the FEN [National Education Federation] and Socialist Youth movements, the IDS is said to have formed 25 clandestine "soldiers' committees" within the French military forces. The secretary-general [Le Trehondat] has made himself known as such without incurring any sanctions in spite of [Minister of Defense] Charles Hernu's statements against such illegal "committees." [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 5 Oct 81 p 26] [COPYRIGHT: 1981 "Valeurs actuelles"]

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GENERAL

FRANCE

NATIONAL RESEARCH, TECHNOLOGY COLLOQUIUM ANNOUNCED

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 5 Sep 81 p 17

[Article by Pierre Langereux: "National Research Colloquium, 13-16 January 1982"]

[Text] The major National Research and Technology Colloquium announced by Jean-Pierre Chevenement, the new minister of research, will be held at the Palais des Congres in Paris on 13-16 January 1982. This decision was made on 30 July at the second meeting of the National Colloquium Organizing Committee chaired by Prof Francois Gros, a member of the Institute of France. The colloquium's executive secretariat will be headed by Mme Marie-Simone Detoeuf, the public relations officer of the National Institute for Nuclear Physics and Particle Physics. The minister had consulted beforehand with directors of those research centers and agencies for which he now has oversight authority and which include, inter alia: the National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS), National Center for Telecommunications Studies (CNET), National Center for Space Studies (CNES), National Office for Aerospace Studies and Research (ONERA), Atomic Energy Commission (CEA), and Solar Energy Commission (COMES).

The National Research and Technology Colloquium will have the following six items on its agenda:

- a. "Research, science, technology and society," in which research's cultural contributions will be discussed;
- b. "Research and technology: a choice and strategy for the future," which will deal with the major balances between research and key fields of activity;
- c. "Expansion of research and technology, a powerful factor in getting out of the economic crisis," which will focus discussions onto the major national and international trends in industrial research and in extension of the public sector;
- d. "Research and technology: men and organizational structures," in which special emphasis will be placed on past results and future prospects, as well as on the regional dimension of research;

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- e. "Science and decisiveness, partners in the making of choices," during which nonscientists will speak and publicly debate the stakes involved in scientific policy;
- f. "Resources to be employed" within the purview of the next program law which the Minister of Research will submit to the 1982 spring session of Parliament.

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